Theodoric of Freiberg’s conception of definitio regarding realities of first intention, and its Aristotelian-Averroistic inspiration

Abstract

In the present work we seek to expose Theodoric of Freiberg’s conception of «definition» regarding «realities of first intention» or «real» entities, showing that it nourishes from certain texts of Aristotle and from Averroes’ interpretation of those texts. First, we will try to determine the status of matter in relation to definition according to Theodoric: that is, whether definition must mention sensible matter, or simply express the properties of the form of sensible substances. In connection with this, we will deal with the problem of the unity of definition concerning its parts, and its foundation. Finally, we will analyze the issue of the relationship between matter and «gender» in the definition, seeking to determine whether gender signifies matter, the compound of matter and form, or just form. On the other hand, since Dietrich considers himself to be, in connection with Averroes, a scrupulous interpreter of the Stagirite, we also hope to contribute to the actual debate about the meaning of Aristotle’s philosophy.