Controversies on the Empirical Significance of Auxiliary Assumptions

Authors

  • María Caamaño Alegre Universidad de Valladolid

Keywords:

Friedman-Twist, auxiliary assumptions, realism in economics, idealization

Abstract

Theoretical laws need to be conjoined with auxiliary assumptions in order to be empirically testable, whether in natural or social science. A particularly heated debate has been developing over the nature and role of these assumptions in economic theories. The so called "F(riedman)-Twist" ("the more significant the theory, the more unrealistic the assumptions", Friedman 1953) as well as some later criticisms by authors like Musgrave, Lawson, Mäki and Cartwright will be examined. I will explore the apparent conflict between the Popperian desideratum to pursue the independent testability of auxiliary assumptions and the idealizational theoretical means needed to isolate causal variables.

Author Biography

María Caamaño Alegre, Universidad de Valladolid

La autora es Profesora Titular de Filosofía de la Ciencia en la Universidad de Valladolid (España). Sus principales áreas de interés son la filosofía general de la ciencia, la metodología de la ciencia, la filosofía del lenguaje y la epistemología. Su investigación se ha centrado en cuestiones limítrofes entre dichos campos, como la inconmensurabilidad, la validez experimental, la evaluación de teorías y las relaciones interteóricas.

References

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Published

27-06-2020

How to Cite

Caamaño Alegre, María. 2020. “Controversies on the Empirical Significance of Auxiliary Assumptions”. Philosophia 80 (1):9-39. https://revistas.uncu.edu.ar/ojs3/index.php/philosophia/article/view/3640.

Issue

Vol. 80 No. 1 (2020)

Section

Artículos

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