Second-Person Perspective and Rationality in moral decisions. Scientific Evidence and the limites of Emotivism
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.48162/rev.50.007Keywords:
Moral emotivism, Second-person perspective, Ethical Rationality, Cognitive ScienceAbstract
The article examines moral emotivism following two lines of argument. The first one considers its alleged support by the results of the cognitive sciences, showing that opposite interpretations of the same evidence are possible. The second one explores the second-person perspective in our ethical decisions. From the analysis we can conclude the fundamental importance of rationality both for the recognition of the other person and for the formation of the ethical judgement. The paper concludes that, even though emotions are necessary, they are not sufficient for the formation of an ethical judgement, underlining that rationality is needed.
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