The Problem of Reflection-c as Pure Apperception in Merritt’s Kant on Reflection and Virtue

Auteurs

  • Laurentzi De Sasia Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile

Mots-clés :

Kant, Merritt, apperception, reflection-c

Résumé

The purpose of this paper is to expose and criticize Melissa Merritt’s interpretation of the concept of reflection in Kant’s philosophical work as presented in her book Kant on Reflection and Virtue. Specifically, it attempts to establish that her equalization between pure apperception and c-reflection is problematic. To achieve this, the paper exposes Merritt’s notions of reflection and compares them with the notion of pure apperception in Kant’s first Critique to show how pure apperception cannot be identified with c-reflection as it is characterized by her.

Biographie de l'auteur

Laurentzi De Sasia, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile

El autor es licenciado en Filosofía y candidato a doctor por la Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile. Su tesis de doctorado trata sobre las diferentes postulaciones del imperativo categórico y los distintos sujetos a los cuales refieren. Sus intereses son el Idealismo Alemán y la Ética, y sus últimos trabajos versan sobre las justificaciones teóricas y aplicaciones prácticas del imperativo categórico para resolver los problemas éticos de la técnica moderna.

Références

Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

Kant, Immanuel. Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

Kant, Immanuel. Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.

Merritt, Melissa. Kant on Reflection and Virtue. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018.

Publiée

30-12-2020

Comment citer

De Sasia, Laurentzi. 2020. « The Problem of Reflection-C As Pure Apperception in Merritt’s Kant on Reflection and Virtue ». Philosophia 80 (2):9-29. https://revistas.uncu.edu.ar/ojs3/index.php/philosophia/article/view/4418.

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