Razones insuficientes: la pérdida del agente en la interpretación racional y la teoría causal de la acción

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.48162/rev.50.017

Keywords:

rational or normativist action explanation, causal theory of action, disappearing agent, agent causality

Abstract

The paper exposes two explanatory proposals to the problem of action in analytic philosophy: the rational or normativist explanation and the Davidsonian causal theory of action. The problem of the disappearing agent in both proposals will be highlighted, showing how ultimately psychological and physiological events take place within a person, but the person serves only as a setting for these events. We will finish with the exposition of a possible way of solution, substantial agent causality, which makes action intelligible and allows the integration of reasons and physical causality within the agent.

Author Biography

Gonzalo Flores Castro Lingán, Universidad de Piura

Magister en Filosofía por la Universidad de Piura (Lima) y doctorando en Filosofía por la Universidad Austral (Buenos Aires), becado por la Fundación John Templeton. Es profesor ordinario auxiliar de la Facultad de Humanidades de la Universidad de Piura. Sus áreas de interés se centran en la antropología filosófica, la metafísica y la filosofía de la naturaleza, especialmente desde el pensamiento aristotélico y tomista. Ha participado como expositor en congresos y jornadas y actualmente realiza su investigación doctoral en el campo de filosofía de la acción.

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Published

30-12-2022

How to Cite

Flores Castro Lingán, Gonzalo. 2022. “Razones Insuficientes: La pérdida Del Agente En La interpretación Racional Y La teoría Causal De La acción”. Philosophia 82 (2):59-83. https://doi.org/10.48162/rev.50.017.

Issue

Vol. 82 No. 2 (2022)

Section

Artículos

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